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EQUITY PREMIUM:  






Equity premium designates four different concepts: Historical Equity Premium (HEP); Expected 
Equity Premium (EEP); Required Equity Premium (REP); and Implied Equity Premium (IEP).  We 
highlight the confusing message conveyed in the literature regarding equity premium and its 
evolution. The confusion arises from not distinguishing among the four concepts and from not 
recognizing that although the HEP is equal for all investors, the REP, the EEP and the IEP differ 
for different investors.  
A unique IEP requires assuming homogeneous expectations for expected growth (g), but we show 
that there are several pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy current prices. We claim that different investors have 
different REPs and that it is impossible to determine the REP for the market as a whole, because it 
does not exist. We also investigate the relationship between (IEP – g) and the risk-free rate. 
There is a kind of schizophrenic approach to valuation: while all authors admit different 
expectations of equity cash flows, most authors look for a single discount rate. It seems as if the 
expectations of equity cash flows are formed in a democratic regime, while the discount rate is 
determined in a dictatorship. 
 




JEL Classification: G12, G31, M21 
 
Keywords: equity premium; equity premium puzzle; required market risk premium; historical 
market risk premium; expected market risk premium; risk premium; market risk premium; 
market premium  
 




EQUITY PREMIUM:  




The equity premium (also called market risk premium, equity risk premium, market premium 
and risk premium) is one of the most important, but also most elusive parameters in finance. 
Some confusion arises from the fact that the term equity premium is used to designate four 
different concepts: 
1.  Historical Equity Premium (HEP): historical differential return of the stock market over 
treasuries.  
2.  Expected Equity Premium (EEP): expected differential return of the stock market over 
treasuries. 
3.  Required Equity Premium (REP): incremental return of the market portfolio over the risk-
free rate required by an investor in order to hold the market portfolio
1. It is needed for 
calculating the required return to equity (cost of equity). The CAPM assumes that REP and 
EEP are unique and that REP = EEP. 
4.  Implied Equity Premium (IEP): the required equity premium that arises from a pricing 
model and from assuming that the market price is correct.  
The four concepts are different
2. The HEP is easy to calculate and is equal for all investors
3, but 
the  REP, the EEP and the IEP are different for different investors and are not observable 
magnitudes. We also claim that there is not an IEP for the market as a whole: different 
investors have different IEPs  and use different REPs. A single IEP requires assuming 
homogeneous expectations for expected growth (g), but there are several pairs (IEP, g) that 
satisfy current prices. 
                                              
* I am grateful to Michael Brennan, Jose Manuel Campa, George Constantinides, Javier Estrada, Christophe Faugere, 
Juan Ignacio Peña, Jay Ritter, Jake Thomas and Tuomo Vuolteenaho for feedback and very helpful comments, and to 
my research assistant, Jose Maria Carabias, for his wonderful assistance. 
1 Or the extra return that the overall stock market must provide over Government Bonds to compensate for the extra 
risk. 
2 We agree with Bostock (2004) when he says that “understanding the equity premium is largely a matter of using 
clear terms”. 
3 Provided they use the same time frame, the same market index, the same risk-free instrument and the same average 
(arithmetic or geometric).  
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An anecdote from Merton Miller (2000, page 3) about the expected market return in the Nobel 
context:  “I still remember the teasing we financial economists, Harry Markowitz, William 
Sharpe, and I, had to put up with from the physicists and chemists in Stockholm when we 
conceded that the basic unit of our research, the expected rate of return, was not actually 
observable. I tried to tease back by reminding them of their neutrino –a particle with no mass 
whose presence was inferred only as a missing residual from the interactions of other particles. 
But that was eight years ago. In the meantime, the neutrino has been detected”. 
Different authors claim different relationships between the four equity premiums defined above. 
These relationships vary widely: 
•  HEP = EEP = REP according to Brealey and Myers (1996); Copeland et al (1995); Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe (2005); Stowe et al (2002); Pratt (2002); Bruner (2004); Bodie, 
Kane and Marcus (2003); Damodaran (2006); Goyal and Welch (2006); Ibbotson Ass. 
(2006).  
•  EEP is smaller than HEP according to Copeland et al (2000, HEP-1.5 to 2%); Goedhart 
et al (2005, HEP-1 to 2%); Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1996, HEP-1%); Mayfield (2004, 
HEP-2.4%); Booth (1999, HEP-2%); Bostock (2004, 0.6 to 1.8%); Dimson, Mars and 
Stauton (2006c, 3 to 3.5%); Siegel (2005b, 2 to 3%); Ibbotson (2002, < 4%); Campbell 
(2002, 1.5 to 2%). 
•  EEP is near zero according to McGrattan and Prescott (2001); Arnott and Ryan (2001); 
Arnott and Bernstein (2002). 
•  Authors who try to find the EEP by means of surveys, such as Welch (2000, 7%); 
Welch (2001, 5.5%); Graham and Harvey (2000, 4.65%); Graham and Harvey (2005, 
2.93%); O'Neill et al (2002, 3.9%). 
•  There is a unique IEP and REP = IEP, according to Damodaran (2001a); Arzac (2005); 
Jagannathan et al (2000); Harris and Marston (2001); Claus and Thomas (2001); Fama 
and French (2002); Goedhart et al (2002); Harris et al (2003); Vivian (2005). 
•  Authors who “have no official position”, such as Brealey and Myers (2000, 2003, 
2005).  
•  Authors who claim “that no-one knows what the REP is”, such as Penman (2003). 
•  Authors who claim that “it is impossible to determine the REP for the market as a 
whole, because it does not exist”, such as Fernandez (2002). 
•  Authors who claim that “different investors have different REPs”, such as Fernandez 
(2004). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review different estimates of the 
Historical Equity Premium (HEP), note that not all the authors get the same result for the HEP, 
and analyze the data. We highlight the change in the market around 1960. Before that date, the 
dividend yield was higher than the risk-free rate, but since that date it has always been smaller. 
In sections 3 and 4, we discuss different estimates of the Expected Equity Premium (EEP) and 
Required Equity Premium (REP). In section 5, we review the equity premium puzzle. Section 6 is 
a review of the prescriptions of the main finance textbooks concerning the risk premium. We 
highlight the confusing message of the textbooks regarding the equity premium and its 
evolution. In section 7, we show that there are several pairs (IEP, g) that explain current market  
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prices and we argue that there is no REP for the market as a whole, but rather different 
investors use different REPs.  We also show a positive relationship between (IEP – g) and the 
risk-free rate after 1960. Section 8 explains the REP used by the author. Finally, section 9 gives 
the conclusions. 
2. Historical Equity Premium (HEP) 
The HEP is the historical average differential return of the market portfolio over risk-free debt
4. 
The most widely cited source is Ibbotson Associates whose U.S. database starts in 1926.
 Another 
frequently used source is the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of 
Chicago.  
2.1. First studies of the historical equity return 
Smith (1926) made the first empirical estimate of the long-run return on stocks (only price 
changes) for the most actively traded stocks from 1901 to 1922, and showed that an equity 
investor (even without market timing or stock selection ability) outperformed a bond investor 
over this period
5.  
Cowles (1939) published the first carefully performed empirical study on the performance of the 
stock market.  Cowles calculated the total return to equity from 1872 to 1937 for the NYSE, 
documenting a positive long-term equity performance. 
Fisher and Lorie (1964), using for the first time the database of stock prices completed at the 
University of Chicago's Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), showed that the average 
return from a random investment in NYSE stocks from 1926 to 1964 was 9.1% a year
6. 
2.2. Estimates of the historical equity premium of the US 
Table 1 contains the 1926-2005 average returns and the HEP for the US according to Ibbotson 
Associates (2006). The HEP in Table 1 is the difference between the average return on the S&P 
500 and the return of Gov. Bonds or T-Bills. However, Ibbotson Associates (2006, page 73) use 
the income return (the portion of the total return that results from a periodic bond coupon 
payment) of Gov. Bonds (5.2%) and consider that the relevant HEP during the period 1926-
2005 is 7.1% (12.3-5.2). 
Schwert (1990) and Siegel (1994, 1999, 2002, 2005a) studied the relationship between U.S. 
equity and bonds before 1926. The data on which they base their studies is less reliable than 
recent data, but the results are interesting nevertheless. Table 2 shows their conclusions: the 
HEP and the inflation in the period 1802-1925 were substantially lower than in subsequent 
                                              
4 This average differential return may be arithmetic or geometric. Different stock market indexes are used as the 
market portfolio, and Government bonds of different maturities are used as risk-free debt. A good discussion of the 
geometric and arithmetic average is Jacquier, Kane, and Marcus (2003). 
5 Three years after publication, the market crash occurred. Benjamin Graham blamed Smith's book for inspiring an 
“orgy of uncontrolled speculation”. 
6  For a more detailed history, see Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006).  
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years
7. Note that Table 1 provides a higher HEP than Table 2 for the period after 1926 because 
Ibbotson do not consider the income return of the bonds. 
Wilson and Jones (2002) provide a monthly stock price index from 1871 through 1999. They 
note that the S&P Index returns have often been misrepresented
8 and reconstruct the weekly 
S&P Composite for the period 1926-56 containing more than 400 stocks (instead of 90 as the 
daily S&P Composite). They get some differences versus other used indexes that are summarized 
in Table 3. 
Ibbotson and Chen (2003) use 1926-2000 historical equity returns and conclude that the 
expected long-term equity premium (relative to the long-term government bond yield) is 5.9% 
arithmetically, and 3.97% geometrically. 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006) employ a new NYSE database for 1815–1925
9 to estimate the 
U.S. equity returns and the HEP since 1792 (but they mention that dividend data is absent pre-
1825, and is incomplete in the period 1825–71). Their main results are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 1 
Returns and HEP according to Ibbotson Associates (2006).  1926-2005 
 Average  return  Standard  Serial 
Nominal Returns 1926-2005  Arithmetic  Geometric  deviation  correlation 
S&P 500  12.3%  10.4%  20.2%  3% 
Income 4.2%  4.2%  1.6%  89% 
Capital appreciation  7.8%  5.9%  19.5%  3% 
Long-Term Gov. Bonds  5.8%  5.5%  9.2%  -8% 
Income 5.2%  5.2%  2.7%  96% 
Capital appreciation  0.5%  0.4%  4.4%  -19% 
T-Bills 3.8%  3.7%  3.1%  91% 
Inflation 3.1%  3.0%  4.3%  65% 
        
HEP over Gov. Bonds  6.5%  4.9%     






                                              
7 Siegel (1999) argues that this is because bond returns were exceptionally low after 1926, while total 
equity returns were relatively stable over the whole time period.  
8 Standard & Poor's first developed stock price indices in 1923 and in 1927 created the Composite Index (90 stocks). 
On 1 March 1957, the Composite was expanded to 500 stocks and renamed S&P 500 Index (its market value was 
$173 billion, 85% of the value of all NYSE listed stocks). From 1926 to 1957, there were 2 different S&P Composite 
indexes: one was weekly and the other was daily. The S&P Composite daily covered 90 stocks until 1957; The S&P 
Composite weekly covered more than 400. 
9 See Goetzmann, Ibbotson, and Peng (2001), who collected U.S. stock market data by hand from 1815.  
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Table 2 
Real returns and HEP from Siegel (2005a) 
         arith. = arithmetic average. geom. = geometric average 
  Average real returns (%)       
 Stocks  Bonds  HEP  (%)   
 arith.  geom.  arith.  geom.  arith.  geom.  Inflation (%) 
1802-1870 8.28  7.02  5.11  4.78 3.17 2.24  0.1 
1871-1925 7.92  6.62  3.93  3.73 3.99 2.89  0.6 
1926-2004 8.78  6.78  2.77  2.25 6.01 4.53  3.1 
1802-2004 8.38  6.82  3.88  3.51 4.50 3.31  1.4 
 
Table 3 
Geometric average of the returns of different indexes in selected periods 
(%)  Cowles  S&P  Wilson and Jones  Ibbotson  CRSP NYSE 
1871-1925 7.24  7.28  7.28     
1926-1940 3.27  4.20  3.23  4.04  3.01 
1941-1956    15.60 15.20  16.11  15.36 
1957-1999    12.10 12.28  12.24  11.79 
1926-1999    11.08 11.00  11.35  10.70 
1871-1999    9.51 9.40     
 
Table 4 
Average return of the US according to Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006) 














Stocks 7.93%  6.99%  14.64%    Stocks  12.39%  10.43%  20.32% 
Bonds 4.17%  4.16%  4.17%    Gov.  Bonds  5.82%  5.44%  9.30% 
Comm. Paper  7.62% 7.57%  3.22%    T-Bills  3.76% 3.72%  3.14% 
Inflation 0.85%  0.61%  7.11%    Inflation  3.12%  3.04%  4.32% 
HEP (Bonds)  3.76%  2.83%      HEP (Bonds)  6.57%  4.99%   
         HEP (Bills)  8.63%  6.71%   
 
Total returns from 1871 to 1925 are constructed from the Price-Weighted NYSE and the Cowles 
Income Return Series. 
In a very interesting article, Siegel and Schwartz (2006) calculate the return of the original S&P 
500 companies since 1957 until 2003 and find that their return has been higher than the return 
of the S&P 500
10. The average geometric return of the S&P 500 was 10.85% (standard deviation 
                                              
10 The market value of the S&P 500 companies that have survived from the original 1957 list was only 31% of the 
2003 year-end S&P 500's market value. Since the S&P 500 was formulated, more than 900 new companies have 
been added to the index (and an equal number deleted from it).  
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Different Historical Equity Premiums (HEP) in the US according to different authors 
    Ibbotson  Shiller WJ  Damodaran  Siegel   Max-min 
   1926-2005  4.9% 5.5%  4.4% 5.1% 4.6%   1.0% 
  Geometric  1926-1957  6.0% 7.3%  5.1% 5.8%     2.2% 




1926-2005  6.5% 7.0%  5.8% 6.7% 6.1%   1.2% 
  Arithmetic  1926-1957  8.8% 10.1%  7.6%  8.7%    2.5% 
   1958-2005  4.9% 5.0%  4.7% 5.4%     0.7% 
   1926-2005  6.7% 6.0%  6.2% 6.3% 6.2%   0.7% 
  Geometric  1926-1957  8.2% 8.4%  7.3% 7.6%     1.1% 
  1958-2005  5.6% 4.3%  5.4% 5.4%     1.3%  HEP vs.  
T-Bills    1926-2005  8.5% 7.7%  7.9% 8.2% 8.2%   0.8% 
 Arithmetic  1926-1957  11.1% 11.2%  9.9%  10.5%     1.4% 
   1958-2005  6.8% 5.4%  6.6% 6.6%     1.5% 
 
Ibbotson figures come from Ibbotson Associates (2006). Shiller figures come from 
http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm.  WJ figures have been updated from Wilson and 
Jones (2002). Damodaran figures come from http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/. Siegel 
figures have been updated from Siegel (2005a). 
Note that not all the authors get the same result, even for the HEP. Table 5 is a comparison of 
the HEP in the US according to different authors. The differences are substantial, especially for 
the period 1926-1957. The differences are mainly due to the stock indexes chosen. It is also 
important to keep in mind that the data from the 19
th century and the first part of the 20
th 
century is quite poor and questionable.  Table 6 shows the differences among the different 
indexes commonly used. 
 
Table 6 
Number of securities in the commonly used US indexes  
 
  S&P composite weekly  Ibbotson  CRSP NYSE 
1926-1957 
228 stocks  in 1927, 410 in 
1928, 480 in 1956 
S&P Composite daily: 
90 stocks 
Growing number of stocks:  
592 in 1927; 1059 in 1957 
1957-2006 abandoned 
S&P Composite daily: 
500 stocks 
Growing number of stocks: 
1500 in 1975; 2813 in 1999 
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2.3. A closer look at the historical data 
Figure 1 show that interest rates were lower than dividend yields until 1958 and than the 
earnings to price ratio until the 1980s. It suggests that many things have changed in the capital 
markets and that the last 40 years have been different from previous decades. It is quite 
reasonable to assume that the portfolio theory, the CAPM, the APT, the VAR analysis, the 
futures and options markets, the appearance of many mutual and hedge funds, the increase in 
the number of investors, the legislation to protect investors, financial innovation, electronic 
trading, portfolio insurance, market participation,… have changed the behaviour and the risk 
attitudes of today’s investors vs. past investors. In fact, financial markets are so different that 
the relative magnitude of dividend yields to interest rates has been reversed.  
It is interesting to look at historical data to know what happened to our grandparents (or to our 
great grandparents), but it is not sensible to assume that their markets and their investment 
behaviour were similar to ours
11.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the 20-year rolling correlation of (dividend yield – RF) versus 
RF (the yield on Government long-term bonds). Again, we may see that something has changed 
in the markets because the correlation has been lower since 1960 than ever before. Figure 3 
shows the raw data used to calculate the correlations of Figure 2 and enables the markets’ 
different behaviors in the periods 1871-1959 and 1960-2005 to be contrasted. In section 7, we 
analyze this data and derive implications. 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the 20-year rolling HEP (arithmetic and geometric) relative to 
the T-Bills. It can be seen that the periods when equity returns most exceeded the T-Bill rates 
were the 50s and the 90s. 
Figure 5 compares the 20-year rolling HEP with the current T-Bond yield. From 1960 to 2000, 












Source: Robert Shiller’s Website: http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
                                              
11 Neither is the Ec1010 exam in 1932 very useful for a student today.  
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Figure 2 







Source of the raw data: Robert Shiller’s Website: http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
 
Figure 3 







Source of the raw data: Robert Shiller’s Website: http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 









Source of the raw data: Robert Shiller’s Website: http://aida.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
 
2.4. Estimates of the Historical Equity Premium (HEP) in other countries 
Blanchard (1993) examined the evolution of stock and bonds rates over the period 1978 to 
1992 for the US, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and the UK. He constructed ‘world’ rates of 
return (using relative GDP weights for the countries) and documented a postwar decline in the 
dividend yield and in various measures of the HEP. 
Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) constructed a database of capital gain indexes for 39 markets, 
with 11 of them starting in 1921 (see Table 7). However, they obtained pre-1970 dividend 
information for only 6 markets. They concluded that “for 1921 to 1996, US equities had the 
highest real return for all countries, at 4.3%, versus a median of 0.8% for other countries. The 
high equity premium obtained for U.S. equities appears to be the exception rather than the 
rule”. According to the authors, “there are reasons to suspect that [the US] estimates are subject 
to survivorship”. 
However, Dimson and Marsh (2001) do not find survivorship bias for the US. They calculate the 
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Table 7 
Equity return of selected countries, according to Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) 
Country Period  Nominal  Return  Real Return  Dollar Return  Inflation 
U.S.   21-96  6.95%  4.32%  6.95%  2.52% 
Sweden 21-96  7.42%  4.29%  7.00%  3.00% 
Germany 21-96  4.43%  1.91%  5.81%  2.47% 
Canada   21-96  5.78%  3.19%  5.35%  2.51% 
U.K. 21-96  6.30%  2.35%  5.20%  3.86% 
France 21-96  9.09%  0.75%  4.29%  8.28% 
Belgium 21-96  4.45%  -0.26%  3.51%  4.73% 
Italy 28-96  10.10%  0.15%  3.22%  9.94% 
Japan 21-96  7.33%  -0.81%  1.80%  8.21% 
Spain 21-96  4.66%  -1.82%  1.53%  6.61% 
Median 39 countries  0.75%  4.68%   
Mean 1.88%  5.09%    11 countries with continuous 
histories back to the 1920s: 




HEP vs. short (30 days) and long-term (10 or 30 years) fixed income in 17 countries. 
1900-2005. Annualized returns 
  HEP relative to 
% p.a.  Bills  Bonds 
 Geometric  Arithmetic  Standard Geometric  Arithmetic  Standard 
Country Mean  Mean  Error Mean Mean  Error 
Australia 7.08  8.49  1.65  6.22  7.81 1.83 
Japan 6.67  9.84  2.70  5.91  9.98 3.21 
South Africa  6.20  8.25  2.15  5.35  7.03 1.88 
Germany 3.83  9.07  3.28  5.28  8.35 2.69 
Sweden 5.73  7.98  2.15  5.21  7.51 2.17 
U.S.  5.51 7.41 1.91  4.52  6.49 1.96 
U.K. 4.43  6.14  1.93  4.06  5.29 1.61 
Italy 6.55  10.46  3.12  4.30  7.68 2.89 
Canada 4.54  5.88  1.62  4.15  5.67 1.74 
France 6.79  9.27  2.35  3.86  6.03 2.16 
Netherlands 4.55  6.61  2.17  3.86  5.95 2.10 
Ireland 4.09  5.98  1.97  3.62  5.18 1.78 
Belgium 2.80  4.99  2.24  2.57  4.37 1.95 
Norway 3.07  5.70  2.52  2.55  5.26 2.66 
Spain 3.40  5.46  2.08  2.32  4.21 1.96 
Denmark 2.87  4.51  1.93  2.07  3.27 1.57 
Switzerland 3.63  5.29  1.82  1.80  3.28 1.70 
Average  4.81 7.14 2.21  3.98  6.08 2.11 
World-ex  U.S.  4.23 5.93 1.88  4.10  5.18 1.48 
Source: Table 3 of  Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2006c).  
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Dimson et al (2006c) use a single database to calculate the historical equity premium for 17 
countries over 106 years (1900-2005). Their estimates (see Table 8) are lower than the 
frequently quoted HEPs, mainly due to the incorporation of the earlier part of the 20
th century 
as well as the opening years of the 21
st century
12.  
But, apart from the historical interest, how useful and accurate is this data? As Dimson et al 
(2006c) point out, “virtually all of the 16 countries experienced trading breaks … often in 
wartime. The U.K. and European exchanges, and even the NYSE, closed at the start of World 
War I…Similarly, the Danish, Norwegian, Belgian, Dutch and French markets …when Germany 
invaded in 1940, and even the Swiss market closed from May to July 1940 for mobilization. … 
Japan after the Great Tokyo Earthquake of 1923. …Germany and Japan from towards the end 
of World War II, and Spain during the Civil War”. They claim that “we were able to bridge 
these gaps”, but this assertion is questionable. They admit that “the end-year index levels 
recorded for Germany for 1943–47, Japan for 1945, and Spain for 1936–38 cannot be 
regarded as market-determined values”. Dimson et al (2006c) explain in their footnote 7 that 
“In Spain, trading was suspended during the Civil War from July 1936 to April 1939, and the 
Madrid exchange remained closed through February 1940; over the closure we assume a zero 
change in nominal stock prices and zero dividends”. It is not clear why this assumption is a 
reasonable one. They also mention one “unbridgeable discontinuity, namely, bond and bill (but 
not equity) returns in Germany during the hyperinflation of 1922–23, when German bond and 
bill investors suffered a total loss of –100%. …bonds and bills can become riskier than equities. 
When reporting equity premiums for Germany … we thus have no alternative but to exclude the 
years 1922–23”. 
In a previous work Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002) show that the HEP was generally 
higher for the second half of the century: the World had 4.7% in the first half, compared to 
6.2% in the second half.  
Table 9 contains some of the HEPs reported by different authors for the US. 
Table 9 
Historical Equity Premium (HEP) for the US according to different authors 
Author(s)   Reference/average  Period for HEP  Value 
Siegel (2002)  T-Bonds, geo.  1926-2001  4.9% 
Ibbotson and Chen (2003)  T-Bonds, geo.  1926-2000  3.97% 
Siegel (2005a)  T-Bonds, geo.  1926-2004  4.53% 
Ibbotson Associates (2006)  T-Bonds arith. capital aprec. only  1926-2005  7.1% 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006)  T-Bonds, geo.  1792-1925  2.83% 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (2006)  T-Bonds, geo.  1926-2004  4.99% 
Goyal and Welch (2006)    1872-2004  4.77% 
Goyal and Welch (2006)    1927-2004  6.35% 
Dimson & al.(2006c)  T-Bonds, geo. US  1900-2005  4.52% 
Dimson & al.(2006c)  T-Bonds, geo. World  1900-2005  4.04% 
                                              
12 Their database contains annual returns on stocks, bonds, bills, inflation, and currencies for 17 countries from 
1900–2005, and is described in Dimson et al (2006a and 2006b). They construct a World equity index (U.S. dollars 
index of 17 countries weighted by their starting-year market capitalization or by their GDP, before capitalizations 
were available) and a World bond index, constructed with each country weighted by its GDP.  The series were 
compiled to avoid the survivorship bias that can arise from backfilling. Their choice of international markets was 
limited by their requirement to have data for the whole century.  
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This section has reviewed different estimates of the Historical Equity Premium (HEP) and shows 
that not all the authors obtain the same result for the HEP. We highlight the change in the 
market around 1960. Before that date, the dividend yield was higher than the risk-free rate, but 
after that date, it has always been smaller. We question the usefulness of historical data to 
predict the future. 
3. Expected Equity Premium (EEP) 
The  Expected Equity Premium (EEP) is the answer to a question we would all (especially 
analysts and fund managers) like to be able to answer accurately in the short term, namely: 
what incremental return can I expect from the market portfolio over the risk-free rate over the 
next few years? 
Estimates of the EEP based on historical analysis presume that the historical record provides an 
adequate guide for future expected long-term behaviour. However, the HEP changes over time, 
and it is not clear why capital market data from the 19
th century or from the first half of the 
20
th century may be useful in estimating expected returns in the 21
st century. 
Numerous papers assert that there must be an EEP common to all investors (to the 
representative investor). But it is obvious that investors do not share “homogeneous 
expectations”
13 and, also, that many investors do not hold the market portfolio but, rather, a 
subgroup of stocks and bonds
14. Heterogeneous investors do not hold the same portfolio of 
risky assets; in fact, no investor must hold the market portfolio to clear the market.  
We claim in section 7 that without “homogeneous expectations” there is not one EEP (but 
several), and there is not one REP (but several).  
3.1. The Historical Equity Premium (HEP) is not a good estimator of the EEP 
Although many authors consider that the equity premium is a stationary process and that the 
HEP is an unbiased estimate of the EEP (unconditional mean equity premium), we do not agree 
with that statement: the HEP is not a good indicator of the EEP. For example, Mehra and 
Prescott (2003) state that “…over the long horizon the equity premium is likely to be similar to 
what it has been in the past”.  
The magnitude of the error associated with using the HEP as an estimate of the EEP is 
substantial. Shiller (2000) points out that “the future will not necessarily be like the past”. 
Booth (1999) concludes that the HEP is not a good estimator of the EEP and estimates the latter 
in 200 basis points below the HEP
15. Mayfield (2004) suggests that a structural shift in the 
process governing the volatility of market returns after the 1930s resulted in a decrease in the 
expected level of market risk, and concluded that EEP = HEP – 2.4% = 5.9% over the yield on 
T-bills (4.1% over yields on T-bonds).  
                                              
13 Brennan (2004) also admits that “different classes of investor may have different expectations about the prospective 
returns on equities which imply different assessments of the risk premium”. 
14 But, even with “homogeneous expectations” (all investors have equal EEP), the REP would not be equal for all 
investors. In that situation, the investors with lower REP would clear the market. 
15 He also points out that the nominal equity return did not follow a random path and that the volatility of the bonds 
increased significantly over the last 20 years.  
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Survivorship bias
16 was identified by Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) as one of the main 
reasons why the results based on historical analyses can be too optimistic. They pointed out 
that the observed return, conditioned on survival (HEP), can overstate the unconditional 
expected return (EEP). However, Li and Xu (2002) show that survival bias fails to explain the 
equity premium puzzle:  “To have high survival bias, the probability of market survival over the 
long run has to be extremely small, which seems to be inconsistent with existing historical 
evidence”. Siegel (1999, p. 13) mentions that “Although stock returns may be lower in foreign 
countries than in the U.S., the real returns on foreign bonds are substantially lower”. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) present a framework allowing for structural breaks in the risk 
premium over time and estimate that the EEP fluctuated between 4% and 6% over the period 
from 1834 to 1999, declined steadily since the 1930s (except for a brief period in the mid-
1970s) and had the sharpest drop in the last decade of the 20
th century.  
Constantinides (2002) addresses different ways in which we may account for biases in the 
sample mean premium in order to estimate the expected premium and draws a sharp distinction 
between conditional, short-term forecasts of the mean equity premium and estimates of the 
unconditional mean. He says that the conditional EEPs at the end of the 20
th century and the 
beginning of the 21
st are substantially lower than the estimates of the unconditional EEP (7%) 
“by at least three measures”. But he concludes that “the currently low conditional, short-term 
forecasts of the equity premium do not necessarily imply that the unconditional estimate of the 
mean premium is lower than the sample average. Therefore, the low conditional forecasts do not 
necessarily lessen the burden on economic theory to explain the large sample average of the 
equity return and premium over the past 130 years”. 
Dimson et al (2003) highlight the survivorship bias relative to the market, “even if we have been 
successful in avoiding survivor bias within each index, we still focus on markets that survived” 
and concluded that the geometric EEP for the world’s major markets should be 3% (5% 
arithmetic). Dimson et al (2006c) admit that “we cannot know today’s consensus expectation for 
the equity premium”, but they conclude that “investors expect an equity premium (relative to 
bills) of around 3-3½% on a geometric mean basis”, substantially lower than the HEP found in 
their own study.  
3.2. Surveys 
A direct way to obtain an expectation of the equity premium is to carry out a survey of 
analysts or investors although Ilmanen (2003) argues that surveys tend to be optimistic: 
“because of behavioural biases, survey-based expected returns may tell us more about hoped-for 
returns than about required returns”. 
Welch (2000) performed two surveys with finance professors in 1997 and 1998, asking them 
what they thought the EEP would be over the next 30 years. He obtained 226 replies, ranging 
from 1% to 15%, with an average arithmetic EEP of 7% above T-Bonds.
17  Welch (2001) 
                                              
16 “Survivorship” or “survival” bias applies not only to the stocks within the market (the fact that databases contain 
data on companies listed today, but they tend not to have data on companies that went bankrupt or filed for 
bankruptcy protection in the past), but also to the markets themselves (“US market’s remarkable success over the last 
century is typical neither of other countries nor of the future for US stocks” (Dimson et al 2004)).  
17 The interest rate paid by long-term T-bonds in April 1998 was approximately 6%. At that time, the most recent 
Ibbotson Associates Yearbook was the 1998 edition, with an arithmetic HEP versus T-bills of 8.9% (1926–1997).  
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presented the results of a survey of 510 finance and economics professors performed in August 
2001 and the consensus for the 30-year arithmetic EEP was 5.5%, much lower just 3 years 
earlier. 
Graham and Harvey (2005) indicate that U.S. CFOs reduced their average EEP from 4.65% in 
September 2000 to 2.93% by September 2005. Over this period, the HEP had fallen only 0.4%.  
Goldman Sachs (O'Neill, Wilson and Masih, 2002) conducted a survey of its global clients in 
July 2002 and the average long-run EEP was 3.9%, with most responses between 3.5% and 
4.5%. The magazine Pensions and Investments (12/1/1998) carried out a survey among 
professionals working for institutional investors and the average EEP was 3%.  
3.3. Regressions  
Attempts to predict the equity premium typically look for some independent lagged predictors 
(X) on the equity premium:    Equity Premiumt = a  + b ·Xt-1 + εt 
Many predictors have been explored in the literature. Some examples are: 
•  Dividend yield: Ball (1978), Rozeff (1984), Campbell (1987), Campbell and Shiller 
(1988), Fama and French (1988), Hodrick (1992), Campbell and Viceira (2002), Campbell 
and Yogo (2003), Lewellen (2004), and Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004). Cochrane 
(1997) has a good survey of the dividend yield prediction literature. 
•  The short-term interest rate: Hodrick (1992).  
•  Earnings price and payout ratio: Campbell and Shiller (1988), Lamont (1998) and Ritter 
(2005). 
•  The term spread and the default spread: Avramov (2002), Campbell (1987), Fama and 
French (1989), and Keim and Stambaugh (1986). 
•  The inflation rate (money illusion): Fama and Schwert (1977), Fama (1981), and 
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004a,b), and Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2005). 
•  Interest rate and dividend-related variables: Ang and Bekaert (2003). 
•  Book-to-market ratio: Kothari and Shanken (1997). 
•  Value of high and low-beta stocks: Polk, Thompson and Vuolteenaho (2004). 
•  Consumption and wealth: Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). 
•  Aggregate financing activity: Baker and Wurgler (2000) and Boudoukh et al (2006). 
Goyal and Welch (2006) used most of the mentioned predictors and could not identify one that 
would have been robust for forecasting the equity premium and, after all their analyses, they 
recommended “assuming that the equity premium is ‘like it always has been’”. They also show 
that most of these models have not performed well for the last thirty years, they are not stable, 
and they are not useful for market-timing purposes.  
However, Campbell and Thompson (2005) claim that some variables (ratios, patterns, levels of 
sort and long-term interest rates) are correlated with subsequent market returns and that  
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“forecasting variables with significant forecasting power insample generally have a better out-
of-sample performance than a forecast based on the historical average return”. 
3.4. Other estimates of the expected equity premium 
Siegel (2002, page 124) concluded that “the future equity premium is likely to be in the range 
of 2 to 3%, about one-half the level that has prevailed over the past 20 years”
 18. Siegel (2005a, 
page 172) affirms that “over the past 200 years, the equity risk premium has averaged about 
3%”. Siegel (2005b) maintains that “although the future equity risk premium is apt to be lower 
than it has been historically, U.S. equity returns of 2-3% over bonds will still amply reward 
those who will tolerate the short-term risk of stocks”. However, in a presentation at the SIA 




Estimates of the EEP (Expected Equity Premium) according to different authors 
Authors  Conclusion about EEP  Note 
Surveys       
Pensions and Investments (1998)   3% Institutional  investors 
Graham and Harvey (2000)   4.65%   CFOs 
Welch (2000)   7% arithmetically, 5.2% geometrically  Finance professors 
Welch (2001)   5.5% arithmetically, 4.7% geometrically  Finance professors 
O'Neill, Wilson and Masih (2002)  3.9%  Global clients Goldman 
Graham and Harvey (2005)   2.93%   CFOs 
Other publications       
Booth (1999)  EEP = HEP - 2%    
Pastor and Stambaugh (2001)  4  -6%    
McGrattan and Prescott (2001)  near zero    
Arnott and Ryan (2001)  near zero    
Arnott and Bernstein (2002)  near zero    
Siegel (2002, 2005b)  2 - 3%    
Ibbotson (2002)  < 4%    
Campbel (2002)  1.5 - 2%    
Mayfield (2004)   EEP = HEP - 2.4%= 5.9% + T-Bill    
Bostock (2004)  0.6 – 1.8%   
Goyal and Welch (2006)  EEP = HEP    
Dimson, Mars and Stauton (2006c)  3 - 3.5%   
Grabowski (2006)  3.5 – 6%   
Maheu and McCurdy (2006)  4.02% and 5.1%.   
Ibbotson Associates (2006)  EEP = HEP = 7.1%   
 
In the TIAA-CREF Investment Forum of June 2002, Ibbotson forecasted “less than 4% in excess 
of long-term bond yields”, and Campbell “1.5% to 2%”. 
                                              
18 Siegel also affirms that: “Although it may seem that stocks are riskier than long-term government bonds, this is 
not true. The safest investment in the long run (from the point of view of preserving the investor’s purchasing power) 
has been stocks, not Treasury bonds”.  
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McGrattan and Prescott (2001) did not find corporate equity overvalued in 2000 and forecasted 
that the real returns on debt and equity should both be near 4%: “Therefore, barring any 
institutional changes, we predict a small equity premium in the future”. 
Arnott and Ryan (2001) claim that the expected equity premium is near zero. They base their 
conclusion on the low dividend yield and their low expectation of dividend growth. Arnott and 
Bernstein (2002) also conclude that “the current risk premium is approximately zero”.  
Bostock (2004) concludes that according to historical average data, equities should offer a risk 
premium over government bonds between 0.6% and 1.8%. 
Grabowski (2006) concludes that “after considering the evidence, any reasonable long-term 
estimate of the normal EEP as of 2006 should be in the range of 3.5% to 6%”. 
Maheu and McCurdy (2006) claim that the US Market had “three major structural breaks (1929, 
1940 and 1969), and possibly a more recent structural break in the late 1990s”, and suggest 
an EEP in 2004 between 4.02% and 5.1%. 
4. Required and implied equity premium 
The Required Equity Premium (REP) of an investor is the incremental return that she requires, 
over the risk-free rate, for investing in a diversified portfolio of shares. It is a crucial parameter 
in valuation and capital budgeting because the REP is the key to determining the company’s 
required return to equity and the required return to any investment project. The HEP is 
misleading in predicting the REP. If there were a reduction in the REP, this fall in the discount 
rate led to re-pricing of stocks, thus adding to the magnitude of the HEP. The HEP, then, 
overstates the REP.  
The IEP is the implicit REP used in the valuation of a stock (or a market index) that matches the 
current market value with an estimate of the future cash flows to equity. Two models are 
widely used to calculate the IEP: the Gordon (1962) model (constant dividend growth model) 
and the residual income (or abnormal return) model. 
According to the Gordon (1962) model, the current price per share (P0) is the present value of 
expected dividends discounted at the required rate of return (k). If d1 is the dividend per share 
expected to be received at time 1, and g the expected long term growth rate in dividends per 
share
19,  
P0  = d1 / (k - g), which implies:    k  = d1/P0 + g.   IEP = d1/P0 + g - RF                          (1) 
The abnormal return method is another version of the Gordon (1962) model when the “clean 
surplus” relationship holds (dt = et – (BVt – BVt-1), where d is the dividends per share, e is the 
earnings per share and bv is the book value per share): 
P0  = bv0 + (e1 – k bv0) / (k - g), which implies:    k  = e1/P0 + g (1 - bv0/ P0)
20               (2) 
                                              
19 Although we say “dividends per share”, we refer to equity cash flow per share: dividends, repurchases and all 
expected cash for the shareholders. 
20 Comparing the two models, it is clear that in a growing perpetuity, D1 = E1 – g BV0. The equivalence of the two 
models may be seen in Fernandez (2005)  
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Jagannathan, McGrattan and  Scherbina (2000) use the Gordon model, assume that dividends 
will grow as fast as GNP, and come up with an estimate of 3.04%. They mention that “to get 
the estimate up to Brealey and Myer’s 9.2%, we would need to assume nominal dividend 
growth of 13.2%. This is an unreasonable assumption”. They also revise Welch (2000) and 
point out that “apparently, finance professors do not expect the equity premium to shrink”. 
Claus and Thomas (2001) calculate the equity premium using the Gordon model and the 
residual income model, assuming that g is the consensus of the analysts’ earnings growth 
forecasts for the next five years and that the dividend payout will be 50%. They also assume 
that the residual earnings growth after year 5 will be the current 10-year risk-free rate less 3%. 
With data from 1985 to 1998, they find that the IEP is smaller than the HEP, and they 
recommend using a REP of about 3% for the US, Canada, France, Germany, Japan and UK. 
Harris and Marston (2001), using the dividend discount model and financial analysts’ estimates 
about the long-run growth in earnings, estimate an IEP of 7.14% for the S&P 500 above T-
Bonds during the period 1982-1998. They also claim that the IEP moves inversely with 
government interest rates, which is hard to believe. 
Easton, Taylor, Shroff and Sougiannis (2002) used the residual income model with IBES data for 
expected growth
21, and estimated an average IEP of 5.3% over the years 1981-1998. 
Goedhart, Koller and Wessels (2002) used the dividend discount model (considering also share 
repurchases), with GDP growth as a proxy for expected earnings growth and with the average 
inflation rate of the last 5 years as a proxy for expected inflation. Table 11 contains the results 
that they reported. They concluded that “the real cost of equity has been remarkably stable at 
about 7% in the US and 6% in the UK since the 1960s. Given current, real long-term bond 
yields of 3% in the US and 2.5% in the UK, the implied equity risk premium is around 3.5% to 
4% for both markets”.  
Table 11 
IEP and real cost of equity in the US and the UK according to Goedhart et al (2002) 
 US    UK 
 1962-1979  1990-2000    1962-1979  1995-2000 
Market risk premium  5.0%  3.6%    4.3%  3.0% 
Real risk-free rate  2.2%  3.1%    1.4%  2.8% 
Real cost of equity  7.2%  6.7%    5.7%  5.8% 
 
Fama and French (2002), using the discounted dividend model, estimated the IEP for the period 
1951-2000 as being between 2.55% and 4.32%, far below the HEP (7.43%). For the period 
1872-1950, they estimated an IEP (4.17%) similar to the HEP (4.4%). They claimed that in the 
period 1951-2000 “a decline in the expected stock return is the prime source of the unexpected 
capital gain”, and that “the unconditional EEP of the last 50 years is probably far below the 
realized premium”
22. 
                                              
21 Although Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2001) report that “IBES forecasts are too optimistic and have low 
predictive power for long-term growth”. 
22 Fama and French (1992) report that in the period 1941-1990 an equally weighted index outperformed the 
weighted value (average monthly returns of 1.12% and 0.93%) in the whole period and in most sub sample periods.  
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Ritter and Warr (2002) claim that in 1979-1997, the IEP declined from +12% to -4%. However, 
Ritter’s estimate of the IEP in 2006 is a little over 2% on a geometric basis. 
Harris, Marston, Mishra and O'Brien (2003) estimated discount rates for several companies 
using the dividend discount model and assuming that g was equal to the consensus of the 
analysts’ growth of dividends per share forecasts. They found an IEP of 7.3% (when the betas 
were calculated using a domestic index) and 9.7% (when the betas were calculated using a 
world index).  
Many authors use an expected growth of dividends per share (g) equal to the consensus of the 
analysts’ forecasts, but Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2006) find that stock returns are positively 
associated with analysts’ divergence of opinion, and consider the divergence of opinion as a 
risk. 
Vivian (2005) replicated Fama and French (2002) to the UK, obtained similar results (see Table 
12), and concluded that the discount rate (REP) declined in the later part of the 20
th Century. 
Table 12 
REP and HEP in the US and in the UK according to Fama and French (2002) and Vivian (2005) 
Table I of Fama and French (2002)    Table 1 of Vivian (2005) 
US REP  HEP    UK  REP  HEP 
1872-2000  3.54%  5.57%  1901-2002  4.41% 5.68% 
1872-1950  4.17%  4.40%  1901-1950  4.22% 3.49% 
1951-2000  2.55%  7.43%  1951-2002  4.60% 7.79% 
       1966-2002  3.00%  6.79% 
 
O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) proposed calculating the REP using accounting figures and got a 
variety of estimates between 4 and 6%. 
Glassman and Hassett (2000) calculated in their book Dow 36,000 that the REP for the U.S. in 
1999 was 3%, arguing that stocks should not carry any risk premium at all, and that stock 
prices will rise dramatically once investors come to realize this fact
23.  
Faugere and Erlach (2006) claimed that the equity premium tracks the value of a put option on 
the S&P 500. However, their conclusion is not very helpful: “using an 8.1% premium in 
valuation formulas and capital budgeting problems may be appropriate, since the observed level 
of the long-run equity premium is fully consistent with the observed steady-state GDP growth 
and consistent with risk explanations as well. However, if one believes that the recent 1990’s 
trends in dividend yields, interest rates, taxes and inflation represent permanent regime shifts, 
our model can be parameterized to yield a 3.5% equity premium”. 





                                              
23 Not to be outdone, Kadlec and Acampora (1999) gave their book the title, Dow 100,000: Fact or Fiction?  
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Table 13 
Implied Equity Premium (IEP) and Required Equity Premium (REP) according to different authors 
Author(s)  Method    IEP = REP 
O'Hanlon and Steele (2000)  accounting    4 to 6% 
Jagannathan & al  (2000)   DDM    3.04% 
Glassman and Hasset (2000)      3% 
Harris and Marston (2001)   DDM    7.14% 
Claus and Thomas (2001)   RIM  1985-1998  3% 
Fama and French (2002)   DDM  1951-2000  2.55% 
Fama and French (2002)   DDM  1872-1950  4.17% 
Goedhart, Koller and Wessels (2002)  DDM  1990-2000  3.5 to 4% 
Ritter (2002)  DDM  2001  0.7% 
Ritter and Warr (2002)   RIM  1979-1997  +12% to -4%. 
Harris & al (2003)   DDM    7.3% 
Vivian (2005)  DDM & RIM  1951-2002 UK  4.6% 
Ibbotson Associates (2006)  REP=EEP=HEP  1926-2005  7.1% 
DDM = dividend discount model.  RIM = residual income model 
5. The equity premium puzzle 
The equity premium puzzle, a term coined by Mehra and Prescott (1985), is the inability of a 
standard representative consumer asset pricing model, using aggregate data, to reconcile the 
HEP. To reconcile the model with the HEP, individuals must have implausibly high risk aversion 
according to standard economic models
24. Mehra and Prescott (1985) argued that stocks should 
provide at most a 0.35% premium over bills. Even after stretching the parameter estimates, 
Mehra and Prescott (2003) concluded that the premium should be no more than 1%. This 
contrasted starkly with their HEP estimate of 6.2%.   
5.1. Attempts to solve the equity premium puzzle 
This puzzle has led to an extensive research effort in both macroeconomics and finance. Over 
the last 20 years, researchers have tried to resolve the puzzle by generalizing and adapting 
(weakening one or more of the assumptions) the Mehra-Prescott (1985) model, but there is still 
no solution that is generally accepted by the economics profession. Some of the adapted 
assumptions include: 
•  Alternative assumptions about preferences (state separability, leisure, precautionary 
savings) or generalizations to state-dependent utility functions: Abel (1990); 
Constantinides (1990); Epstein and Zin (1991); Benartzi and Thaler (1995); Bakshi and 
Chen (1996); Campbell and Cochrane (1999); and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001),  
•  Narrow framing
25: Barberis and Huang (2006), 
                                              
24 Kocherlakota (1996) reduces the models to just 3 assumptions: individuals have preferences associated with the 
standard utility function, asset markets are complete (individuals can write insurance contracts against any 
contingency), and asset trading is costless.  
25 Narrow framing is the phenomenon documented in experimental settings whereby, when people are offered a new 
gamble, they sometimes evaluate it in isolation, separately from their other risks.  
20 -  IESE Business School-University of Navarra 
•  Probability distributions that admit disastrous events such as fear of catastrophic 
consumption drops: Rietz (1988); Mehra and Prescott (1988), Barro (2005), 
•  Survivorship bias: Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross (1995),  
•  Liquidity premium: Bansal and Coleman (1996), 
•  Taxes and regulation: McGrattan and Prescott (2005), 
•  The presence of uninsurable income shocks or incomplete markets: Mankiw (1986); 
Constantinides and Duffie (1996); Heaton and Lucas (1996) and (1997); Storesletten, 
Telmer, and Yaron (1999),  
•  Relative volatility of stocks and bonds: Asness (2000) 
•  Limited stock market participation and limited diversification: Saito (1995), Basak and 
Cuocco (1998), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Gomes and 
Michaelides (2005), 
•  Distinguishing between the cash flows to equity and aggregate consumption: Brennan 
and Xia (2001), who claim to be able to justify an equity premium of 6%. 
•  Borrowing constraints: Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002),  
•  Other market imperfections: Aiyagari and Gertler (1991); Alvarez and Jermann (2000), 
•  Disentangling the equity premium into its cash flow and discounting components: 
Bakshi and Chen (2006); 
•  Measurement errors and poor consumption growth proxies: Breeden, Gibbons, and 
Litzenberger (1989), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Ferson and Harvey (1992), Ait-Sahalia, 
Parker, and Yogo (2004). 
There are several excellent surveys of this work, including Kocherlakota (1996), Cochrane 
(1997) and Mehra and Prescott (2003 and 2006). Kocherlakota (1996) says that “while there are 
several plausible explanations for the low level of Treasury returns, the large equity premium is 
still largely a mystery to economists”. 
Rietz (1988) and Barro (2005) suggest that low-probability disasters, such as a large “crash” in 
consumption, may justify a large equity premium. However, Mehra and Prescott (1988) 
challenge Rietz to identify such catastrophic events and estimate their probabilities. 
McGrattan and Prescott (2005) argue that the 1960-2001 HEP is mainly due to changes in taxes 
and regulatory policy during this period. They also say that “Allowing for heterogeneous 
individuals will also help quantify the effects of increased market participation and 
diversification that has occurred in the past two decades. Until very recently, mutual funds were 
a very expensive method of creating a diversified equity portfolio”.  
Limited stock market participation can increase the REP by concentrating stock market risk on 
a subset of the population. To understand why limited participation may have quantitative 
significance for the REP, it is useful to review basic facts about the distribution of wealth, and 
its dynamics over time. Mishel, Bernstein and Allegretto (2006) document that wealth and stock 
holdings in the U.S. remain highly concentrated in dollar terms: in 2004, the wealthiest 10% 
held 78.8% of the stocks (84% in 1989 and 76.9% in 2001), and the wealthiest 20% held over  
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90% of all stocks. Only 48.6% of U.S. households held stocks in 2004 (51.9% in 2001 and 
31.7% in 1989) and only 34.9% (40.1% in 2001 and 22.6% in 1989) held stock worth more than 
$5,000. Of this 34.9%, only 13.5% had direct holdings. Mankiw and  Zeldes (1991) reported that 
72.4% of the 2998 families in their survey held no stocks at all. Among families that held more 
than $100,000 in other liquid assets, only 48% held stock. The covariance of stock returns and 
consumption of the families that hold stocks is triple that of the families that hold no stocks ant 
it may explain part of the puzzle.  
Brennan (2004) highlights the “democratization of Equity Investment”: “The increase in the 
number of participants in equity markets was accompanied by a massive increase in the scale of 
the equity mutual fund industry: the assets under management rose from $870 per capita in 
1989 to over $14,000 per capita in 1999, before declining to a little over $12,000 per capita 
in 2001. On the other hand, holdings of bond mutual funds grew only from $966 per capita in 
1989 to $2887 in 1999. In other words, while bond funds roughly tripled, equity funds went up 
by a factor of over 14!” and “the share of corporate equity held by mutual funds rose from 6.6% 
in 1990 to 18.3% in 2000”. 
Heaton and Lucas (2000) introduced Limited Participation and Limited Diversification in an 
overlapping generations model and concluded that the increases in participation over the past 
two decades are unlikely to cause a significant reduction in the EEP, but that improved 
portfolio diversification might explain a fall in the EEP of several percentage points. 
There is some promising research on heterogeneity. Abel (1991) hoped that “incorporating 
differences among investors or more general attitudes toward risk can explain the various 
statistical properties of asset returns”. Levy and Levy (1996) mentioned that the introduction of 
a small degree of diversity in expectations changed the dynamics of their model and produced 
more realistic results.  Constantinides and Duffie (1996) introduced heterogeneity in the form of 
uninsurable, persistent and heteroscedastic labor income shocks. Bonaparte (2006) used micro 
data on households' consumption and provides a new method for estimating asset pricing 
models, considering each household as living on an island and taking into account its lifetime 
consumption path. Due to the great deal of heterogeneity across households, he replaced the 
representative agent with an average agent.  
Bakshi and Chen (2006) claim that “disentangling the equity premium into its cash flow and 
discounting components produces an economically meaningful equity premium of 7.31%”.  
Shalit and Yitzhaki (2006) show that at equilibrium, heterogeneous investors hold different 
risky assets in portfolios, and no-one must hold the market portfolio. 
The quote in Siegel and Thaler (1997) is interesting: “no economic theorist has been completely 
successful in resolving the [equity premium] puzzle” ... but ... “most economists we know have a 
very high proportion of their retirement wealth invested in equities (as we do)”. 
6. The equity premium in the textbooks 
This section contains the main messages about the equity premium conveyed in the finance 
textbooks and valuation books. More details may be found in Fernandez (2006). Figure 6 shows 
the evolution of the Required Equity Premium (REP) used or recommended by the textbooks 
and by the academic papers mentioned in previous sections. Table 14 contains the equity 
premium recommended and used in different editions of several textbooks. Ritter (2002)  
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mentions the use of the historical equity risk premium in textbooks as an estimate of the future 
as one of the "The Biggest Mistakes We Teach". Looking at Figure 6 and at Table 14, it is quite 
obvious that there is not much consensus, which create a lot of confusion among students and 
practitioners (and finance authors, also) about the Equity Premium. 




th editions (1984, 1988, 
1991 and 1996), using Ibbotson data that ranged from 8.2 to 8.5% (arithmetic HEPs over T-Bills 
in periods starting in 1926).   In the 6
th, 7
th and 8
th editions (2000, 2003 and 2005 with Allen), 
they said that “Brealey, Myers and Allen have no official position on the exact market risk 
premium, but we believe that a range of 5 to 8.5 percent is reasonable for the risk premium in 
the United States.” (In the previous editions, the range was 6 to 8.5%).  
Copeland, Koller and Murrin (McKinsey) used a REP = geometric HEP versus Government T-
Bonds in the two first editions (1990 and 1995). However, they changed criteria in the 3
rd and 
4
th editions: they suggested using the arithmetic HEP of 2-year returns versus Government T-
Bonds reduced by a survivorship bias.  In the 1
st edition (1990), they recommended 5-6%, in the 
2
nd edition (1995) they recommended 5-6%, in the 3
rd edition (2000) they recommended 4.5-5% 
(“we subtract a 1.5 to 2% survivorship bias from the long-term arithmetic average of 6.5%”) 
and in the 4
th edition (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2005) they recommended 3.5-4.5% (“we 
subtract a 1% to 2% survivorship bias from the long-term arithmetic average of 5.5%”). 
Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe recommended in all editions that REP = EEP = arithmetic HEP vs. T-
Bills, using Ibbotson data. In (1988, 2
nd edition), (1993, 3
rd edition) and (1996, 4
th edition) they 
recommended 8.5%. In (1999, 5
th edition) 9.2%; in (2002, 6
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Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1993, 2
nd edition) used a REP = EEP = 6.5% to value Hewlett-Packard. 
In the 3
rd edition (1996, page 535), they used a REP = EEP = HEP – 1% = 7.75% to value 
Motorola. In the 5
th edition (2002, page 575), they valued Motorola using a REP = 6.5%. In the 
6
th edition (2003), they used different REPs in the examples:  8% (pages 426, 431) and 5% (page 
415). 
Damodaran (1994, 2002) recommended REP = EEP = geometric HEP versus T-bonds. In 1997 he 
used a REP = arithmetic HEP versus T-Bills. In 2001 and 2006, he recommended REP = EEP =  
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IEP. Damodaran on Valuation (1994), recommended an EEP of 5.5%, the geometric HEP using 
T-bonds for the period 1926-1990. Damodaran (2001a, 2006, 2
nd edition) used a REP =IEP of 
4% for the US. because “the implied premium for the US and the average implied equity risk 
premium has been about 4% over the past 40 years”. Damodaran (1996, 1997, 2001b, 2001c 
and 2002), however, used a REP of 5.5%. In (1996. page 48) he shows that 5.5% is the 
geometric HEP versus T-bonds in the period 1926-90. 
Copeland and Weston (1979, 1988) used a REP = 10%. However, Weston and Copeland (1992) 
used a REP = 5%. 
Van Horne (1968, 1
st ed.) still did not mention the CAPM or the equity premium. In (1983, 6
th 
ed.), he used a REP = 6% He justified it: “Suppose, for easy illustration, that the expected risk-
free rate is an average of the risk-free rates that prevailed over the ten-year period and that the 
expected market return is the average of market returns over that period”. In (1992, 
Fundamentals, 8
th ed.), he used a REP = 5% and justified it: “Assume that a rate of return of 
about 13% on stocks in general is expected to prevail and that a risk-free rate of 8% is 
expected”.  
Penman (2001, 1
st ed.) said that “the market risk premium is a big guess. Research papers and 
textbooks estimate it in the range of 4.5% to 9.2%. … No-one knows what the market risk 
premium is”. In (2003, 2
nd ed.), he admitted that “we really do not have a sound method to 
estimate the cost of capital… Estimates [of the equity premium] range, in texts and academic 
research, from 3.0% to 9.2%”, and he used 6%. 
Weston and Brigham (1968) still did not define equity premium. In (1982, 6
th edition) they said 
that “the market risk premium can be considered relatively stable at 5 to 6% for practical 
application”. Weston, Chung and Siu (1997) recommended 7.5%. Bodie and Merton (2000) used 
8% for USA.  
Stowe, Robinson, Pinto and McLeavey (2002), in their book for the CFA (Chartered Financial 
Analysts) Program, use (page 49) a REP = Geometric HEP using T-Bonds during 1926-2000, 
according to Ibbotson = 5.7%. Pratt (2002) assumes that REP=EEP=HEP and uses 7.4% (page 
68) and 8% (page 74). Hawawini and Viallet (2002) use a REP = 6.2% = geometric HEP over T-
bonds in the period 1926-1999 according to Ibbotson. 
Fernandez (2002) is the only finance textbook claiming that “it is impossible to determine the 
premium for the market as a whole, because it does not exist”. He also mentions that we “could 
only talk of a market risk premium if all investors had the same cash flow expectations… 
However, expectations are not homogeneous”. Fernandez (2004, 2001) also mentioned that “the 
HEP, the EEP and the REP are different concepts” and that “different investors have different 
REPs”. In the examples he uses REP = 4%. 
Palepu, Healy and Bernard (2004, page 8-3) mention that the HEP “constitutes an estimate of 
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 Table 14 
Equity premiums recommended and used in textbooks 
Author(s) of the Textbook  Assumption  Period for HEP 
REP 
recommended  REP used 
Brealey and Myers          
2nd edition. 1984  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-81  8.3%  8.3% 
3rd edition. 1988  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-85  8.4%  8.4% 
4th edition. 1991  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills 1926-88  8.4%  8.4% 
5th edition. 1996  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills    8.2 - 8.5%   
6th and 7th edition. 2000 and 2003  No official position    6.0 - 8.5%  8.0% 
8th edition. 2005 (with Allen)  No official position    5.0 - 8.5%   
Copeland, Koller and Murrin (McKinsey)        
1st edition. 1990  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs. T-Bonds  1926-88  5 - 6%  6% 
2nd ed. 1995  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs. T-Bonds  1926-92  5 - 6%  5.5% 
3rd ed. 2000  REP=EEP= arith HEP – 1.5-2%  1926-98  4.5 - 5%  5% 
4th ed. 2005. Goedhart, Koller & Wessels  REP=EEP= arith HEP – 1-2%  1903-2002  3.5 – 4.5%  4.8% 
Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe         
2nd edition. 1988  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-88  8.5%  8.5% 
3rd edition. 1993  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-93  8.5%  8.5% 
4th edition. 1996  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills 1926-94  8.5%  8.5% 
5th edition. 1999  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills 1926-97  9.2%  9.2% 
6th edition. 2002  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills 1926-99  9.5%  9.5% 
7th edition. 2005  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills 1926-02  8.4% 8% 
Van Horne, 6th edition. 1983        6.0% 
8th edition. 1992      3 - 7%  5.0% 
Copeland and Weston (1979 and 1988)       10% 
Weston and Copeland (1992)       5% 
Bodie, Kane and Marcus        
2nd edition. 1993  REP=EEP    6.5%  6.5% 
3rd edition. 1996  REP=EEP=arith HEP vs. T-Bills - 1%    7.75%  7.75% 
5th edition. 2002      6.5%  6.5% 
2003  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs. T-Bills  1926-2001    5%; 8% 
Damodaran    1994 Valuation. 1
st ed.  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-90  5.5%  5.5% 
1996, 1997, 2001b,  2001c  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds    5.5%  5.5% 
2001a average  IEP  1970-2000  4%  4% 
2002  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1928-00  5.51%  5.51% 
2006 Valuation. 2
nd ed.  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1928-2004  4.84%  4% 
Weston & Brigham (1982)      5-6%   
Weston, Chung and Siu (1997)      7.5%   
Bodie and Merton (2000)         8% 
Stowe et al (2002)  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-00  5.7%  5.7% 
Hawawini and Viallet (2002)  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-99    6.2% 
Pratt (2002)  REP=EEP=HEP      7.4%, 8% 
Fernandez (2002)  “is impossible to determine the premium for the market as a whole”   
Penman (2003)  “No-one  knows what the REP is”      6% 
Fernandez (2001, 2004)  “different investors have different REPs”    4% 
Bruner (2004)  REP=EEP= geo HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-2000  6%  6% 
Palepu, Healy and Bernard (2004)   REP=EEP= arith HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-2002  7%  7% 
Weston, Mitchel & Mulherin (2004)  REP=EEP= arith HEP vs.T-Bonds  1926-2000  7.3%  7% 
Arzac (2005)  REP=IEP    5.08%  5.08% 
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Weston, Mitchel and Mulherin (2004) mention that the arithmetic HEP over T-bonds in the 
period 1926-2000 according to Ibbotson was 7.3% and (page 260) they use REP = EEP = 7%. 
Bruner (2004) used a REP of 6% because “from 1926 to 2000, the risk premium for common 
stocks has averaged about 6% when measured geometrically”. 
Arzac (2005) uses a REP = IEP = 5.08% for a valuation done in December 2002 (the IEP equity 
premium as of that date calculated using the Gordon equation). 
In the following section we claim that the confusion comes from the fact that there is not a 
REP for the market as a whole: different investors use different REPs. The last sentence may be 
rewritten as: there is not an IEP for the market as a whole: different investors use different 
IEPs. A single IEP requires assuming homogeneous expectations for the expected growth (g), 
but there are several pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy current prices. 
7. There is not an IEP, but many pairs (IEP, g) which are consistent 
with market prices 
Even if market prices are correct for all investors, there is not a single REP common to all 
investors. In a simple Gordon model, there are many pairs (Ke, g) that satisfy equation (1). As 
Ke is the sum of the Implied Equity Premium (IEP) plus the risk-free rate (RF), there are many 
pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy equation (1). A single IEP requires assuming homogeneous 
expectations for the expected growth (g). If equation (1) holds, the expected return for the 
shareholders is equal to the required return for the shareholders (Ke), but there are many 
required returns (as many as expected growths, g) in the market. On top of that, IEP and g 
change over time. 
If investors’ expectations were homogenous, it would make sense to calculate a single IEP, as 
all investors would have the market portfolio and the same expectations regarding the 
portfolio
26. However, as expectations are not homogenous
27, different investors use different 
REPs: investors who expect higher growth will have a higher REP. Heterogeneous investors do 
not hold the same portfolio of risky assets; in fact, no investor must hold the market portfolio 
to clear the market: it does not make sense to search for a common REP because it does not 
exist. 
We can find out an investor’s REP by asking him, although for many investors the REP is not 
an explicit parameter but, rather, an implicit one that manifests in the price they are prepared 
to pay for shares
28. However, it is impossible to determine the REP for the market as a whole, 
because it does not exist. Even if we knew the market premiums of all the investors who 
operate on the market, it would be meaningless to talk of a premium for the market as a whole.  
 
                                              
26 Even then, this method requires knowing the expected growth of dividends. A higher growth estimate implies a 
higher premium. 
27 Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2006) document analysts’ divergence of opinion. 
28 An example: An investor is prepared to pay 80 euros for a perpetual annual cash flow of 6 euros in year 1 and 
growing at an annual rate of 3%, which he expects to obtain from a diversified equity portfolio. This means that his 
required market return is 10.5% ([6/80] + 0.03).   
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A rationale for this may be found in the aggregation theorems of microeconomics, which in 
actual fact are non-aggregation theorems. One model that works well individually for a number 
of people may not work for all of the people together
29. For the CAPM, this means that 
although the CAPM may be a valid model for each investor, it is not valid for the market as a 
whole, because investors do not have the same return and risk expectations for all shares. 
Prices are a statement of expected cash flows discounted at a rate that includes the risk 
premium. Different investors have different cash flow expectations and different future risk 
expectations. One could only talk of an equity premium if all investors had the same cash flow 
expectations. 
Reallocating terms in equation (1), we get: 
IEP – g = d1/P0 - RF                                                                                                      (3) 
There are many pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy the Gordon equation at any moment. All the papers 
that we reviewed in section 5 assume that there is an “expected growth rate for the market” and 
get an “IEP for the market”. But without homogeneous expectations, there is not an “expected 
growth rate for the market”. 
Similarly, in order to have an EEP that is common to all investors, we need to assume 
homogeneous expectations (or a representative investor) and, with our knowledge of financial 
markets, this assumption is not reasonable. A theory with a representative investor cannot 
explain either why the annual trading volume of most exchanges more than doubles the market 
capitalization. 
We also find that the difference (IEP – g),
30 is related to the risk-free rate in the period after 
1960. Figure 7 shows the relationship for the period after 1980 for the US, Spain and the UK. It 
shows the high negative correlation between (IEP – g) and the risk-free rate in all three markets. 










                                              
29 As Mas-Colell et al. (1995, page 120) say, “it is not true that whenever aggregate demand can be generated by a 
representative consumer, this representative consumer’s preferences have normative contents. It may even be the 
case that a positive representative consumer exists but that there is no social welfare function that leads to a 
normative representative consumer.” 
30 (d1/P0 - RF) is equal to (IEP – g)  
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Figure 7 
Correlations (d1/P0 - RF) – (RF) for the US, Spain and the UK. Monthly data 
(d1/P0 - RF) = IEP – g 
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Table 15 
Regressions with monthly data of Y (IEP – g) on RF (10 year Gov. Bond Yield) Monthly data 
 (d1/P0 - RF) = IEP – g  
  Full period  (R squared)    Without 1997-02  (R squared) 
USA 1980-2006  Y = -0.5523 RF - 0.5289%  0.9060    Y = -0.5864 RF - 0.1278%  0.9417 
Germany 1980-2006  Y = -0.7192 RF + 0.5907%  0.8205    Y = -0.7569 RF + 0.9362%  0.8427 
UK 1980-2006  Y = -0.6833 RF + 1.2913%  0.9469    Y = -0.7195 RF + 1.7119%  0.9551 
France 1988-2006  Y = -0.9587 RF + 2.5862%  0.9245    Y = -1.0273 RF + 3.2364%  0.9625 
Italy 1991-2006  Y = -1.0693 RF + 3.0398%  0.9563    Y = -1.1223 RF + 3.7155%  0.9730 
Spain 1991-2006  Y = -0.6705 RF + 0.6596%  0.9473    Y = -0.7135 RF + 1.1954%  0.9747 
 
Source of the data: Datastream. 
8. How do I calculate the REP? 
In order to calculate a company’s cost of equity (required return to equity cash flows) , a 
valuator has to answer the following question: which differential rate over current T-Bond 
yields do I think compensates the risk of holding the shares? If there is only one owner of the 
shares, we can ask him the question directly. But if it is a traded company, the valuator has to 
make a prudential judgment. As Grabowski (2006), points out, “the entire appraisal process is 
based on applying reasoned judgment to the evidence derived from economic, financial and 
other information and arriving at a well reasoned opinion of value”.  
We need the cost of equity to discount the company’s expected equity cash flows . Note that 
there is a kind of schizophrenic approach to valuation: while all authors admit that different 
valuators and investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows, most authors look 
for a single discount rate. It seems as if the expectations of equity cash flows are formed in a 
democratic regime, while the discount rate is determined in a dictatorship. In any market, 
different investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows and different 
evaluations of its risk (that translate into different discount rates). Then, in the case of a traded 
company, there are investors who think that the company is undervalued (and buy or hold 
shares), investors who think that the company is overvalued (and sell or not buy shares), and 
investors who think that the company is fairly valued (and sell or hold shares). The investors 
who did the last trade, or the rest of the investors who held or did not have shares do not have 
a common REP (nor common expectations of equity cash flows). 
To calculate the REP, we must answer the same question, but based on a diversified portfolio of 
shares, instead of just one company’s shares . In the valuations that I have done in the 21
st 
century, I have used REPs between 3.8 and 4% for Europe and for the U.S. Given the yields of 
the T-Bonds, I think
31 that an additional 4% compensates for the additional risk of a diversified 
portfolio.  
 
                                              
31 As do those clients of mine who are able to answer to that question.  
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9. Conclusion 
The equity premium (also called market risk premium, equity risk premium, market 
premium and risk premium), is one of the most important but also most elusive parameters 
in finance. Much of the confusion arises from the fact that the term equity premium is used 
to designate four different concepts (although they are often mixed): Historical Equity 
Premium (HEP), Expected Equity Premium (EEP); Required Equity Premium (REP) and 
Implied Equity Premium (IEP).  
In the finance literature and in valuation textbooks, there are authors who claim different 
identities among the four equity premiums defined above: some claim that HEP = EEP = REP; 
others claim that EEP is smaller than HEP; others claim that there is a single IEP and that REP 
= IEP; others “have no official position”; others claim that EEP is near zero; others try to find 
the EEP doing surveys; others affirm “that no-one knows what the REP is”.  
The HEP is equal for all investors, but the REP, the EEP and the IEP are different for different 
investors. There is not an IEP for the market as a whole: different investors have different IEPs 
and use different REPs. A single IEP requires assuming homogeneous expectations for the 
expected growth (g), but there several pairs (IEP, g) that satisfy current prices. 
We claim that different investors have different REPs and that it is impossible to determine the 
REP for the market as a whole, because it does not exist.
 Heterogeneous investors do not hold 
the same portfolio of risky assets; in fact, no investor must hold the market portfolio to reach 
equilibrium. 
There is a kind of schizophrenic approach to valuation: while all authors admit that different 
valuators and investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows, most authors look 
for a single discount rate. It seems as if the expectations of equity cash flows are formed in a 
democratic regime, while the discount rate is determined in a dictatorship. In any market, 
different investors may have different expectations of equity cash flows and different 
evaluations of its risk (that translate into different discount rates).  
It has been argued that, from an economic standpoint, we need to establish the primacy of the 
EEP, since it is what guides investors' decisions. However, the REP is more important for many 
important decisions, among wich we can include, valuations of projects and companies, 
acquisitions, and corporate investment decisions. On the other hand, EEP is important only for 
the investors who hold the market portfolio. 
In order to calculate a company’s cost of equity (required return to equity cash flows), a 
valuator has to answer the following question: which differential rate over current T-Bond 
yields do I think compensates the risk of holding the shares? If there is only one owner of the 
shares, we can ask him the question directly. But if it is a traded company, the valuator has to 
make a prudential judgment. There are investors who think that the company is undervalued 
(and buy or hold shares), investors who think that the company is overvalued (and sell or not 
buy shares), and investors who think that the company is fairly valued (and sell or hold shares). 
To calculate the REP, we must answer the same question, but based on a diversified portfolio of 
shares, instead of just one company’s shares. Recently, I have used REPs between 3.8 and 4% 
for Europe and for the U.S. Given the yields of the T-Bonds, I think that an additional 
4% compensates the additional risk of a diversified portfolio.  
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